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TESTING AFFILIATION IN PRIVATE-VALUES MODELS OF FIRST-PRICE AUCTIONS
USING GRID DISTRIBUTIONS
BY LUCIANO I. DE CASTRO AND HARRY J. PAARSCH
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
University of Melbourne
Within the private-values paradigm, we construct a tractable empirical model of
equilibrium behaviour at ﬁrst-price auctions when bidders’ valuations are potentially
dependent, but not necessarily afﬁliated. We develop a test of afﬁliation and apply
our framework to data from low-price, sealed-bid auctions held by the Department of
Transportation in the State of Michigan to procure road-resurfacing services: we do not
reject the hypothesis of afﬁliation in cost signals.
1. Motivation and Introduction. During the past half century, economists have made considerable
progress in understanding the theoretical structure of equilibrium strategic behaviour under market mecha-
nisms, such as auctions, when the number of potential participants is relatively small; see Krishna [2010] for
a comprehensive presentation and evaluation of progress.
One analytic device, commonly used to describe bidder motivation at single-object auctions, is a con-
tinuous random variable which represents individual-speciﬁc heterogeneity in valuations. The conceptual
experiment involves each potential bidder’s receiving a draw from a distribution of valuations. Conditional
on his draw, a bidder is then assumed to act purposefully, maximizing either the expected proﬁt or the ex-
pected utility of proﬁt from winning the auction. Another frequently-made assumption is that the valuation
draws of bidders are independent and that the bidders are ex ante symmetric—their draws being from the
same distribution of valuations. This framework is often referred to as the symmetric independent private-
valuesparadigm(symmetricIPVP).Undertheseassumptions,aresearchercanthenfocusonarepresentative
agent’s decision rule when describing equilibrium behaviour.
At many real-world auctions, the latent valuations of potential bidders are probably dependent in some
way.Inauctiontheory,ithasbeenassumedthatdependencesatisﬁesafﬁliation,atermcoinedbyMilgrom and Weber
[1982]. Afﬁliation is a condition concerning the joint distribution of signals. Often, afﬁliation is described
using the intuition presented by Milgrom and Weber: “roughly, this [afﬁliation] means that a high value of
one bidder’s estimate makes high values of the others’ estimates more likely.” Thus described, afﬁliation
seems like a relatively innocuous condition. In the case of continuous random variables, following the path
blazed by Karlin [1968], some refer to afﬁliation as multivariate total positivity of order two, or MTP2 for
short. Essentially, under afﬁliation, with continuous random variables, the off-diagonal elements of the Hes-
sian of the logarithm of the joint probability density function of signals are all non-negative; i.e., the joint
probability density function is log-supermodular. Under joint normality of signals, afﬁliation requires that
all the pair-wise covariances be weakly positive.
How is afﬁliation related to other forms of dependence? Consider two continuous random variables V1
and V2, having joint probability density function fV1,V2(v1,v2) as well as conditional probability density
functions fV2|V1(v2|v1) and fV1|V2(v1|v2) and conditional cumulative distribution functions FV2|V1(v2|v1) and
FV1|V2(v1|v2). Introduce g( ) and h( ), functions that are nondecreasing in their arguments. de Castro [2007]
has noted that afﬁliation implies a) [FV2|V1(v2|v1)/fV2|V1(v2|v1)] is decreasing in v1 (and v2 in the other case),
AMS 2000 subject classiﬁcations: Primary 62P20, 91B26; secondary 91B44.
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often referred to as a decreasing inverse hazard rate, which implies b) Pr(V2 ≤ v2|V1 = v1) is nonincreasing
in v1 (and v2 in the other case), also referred to as positive regression dependence, which implies c) Pr(V2 ≤
v2|V1 ≤ v1) is nonincreasing in v1 (and v2 in the other case), also referred to as left-tail decreasing in v1
(v2), which implies d) cov[g(V1,V2),h(V1,V2)] is positive, which implies that e) cov[g(V1),h(V2)] is positive,
which implies f) cov(V1,V2) is positive. The important point to note is that afﬁliation is a much stronger
form of dependence than positive covariance. In addition, de Castro [2007] has demonstrated that, within
the set of all signal distributions, the set satisfying afﬁliation is small, both in the topological sense and in
the measure-theoretic sense.
Afﬁliationdeliversseveralpredictionsandresults:ﬁrst,underafﬁliation,theexistenceanduniquenessofa
monotone pure-strategy equilibrium (MPSE) is guaranteed. Also, four commonly-studied auction formats—
the oral, ascending-price (often referred to by economists as the English) and the second-price, sealed-bid
(often referred to by economists as the Vickrey) as well as two ﬁrst-price ones—can be ranked in terms of the
revenues they can be expected to generate. Speciﬁcally, the expected revenues at English auctions are weakly
greater than those at Vickrey auctions which are greater than those at ﬁrst-price auctions—either the sealed-
bid or the oral, descending-price (often referred to by economists as the Dutch) formats. Note, however,
that when bidders are asymmetric, their valuation draws being from different marginal distributions, these
rankings no longer apply. In fact, in general, very little can be said about the revenue-generating properties
of the various auction formats and pricing rules under asymmetries.
Investigating equilibrium behaviour at auctions, empirically, when latent valuations are afﬁliated, has
challenged researchers for some time. Laffont and Vuong [1996] showed that identiﬁcation has been im-
possible to establish in many models when afﬁliation is present. In fact, Laffont and Vuong demonstrated
that any model within the afﬁliated-values paradigm (AVP) is observationally equivalent to a model within
the afﬁliated private-values paradigm (APVP). For this reason, virtually all empirical workers who have
considered some form of dependence have worked within the APVP.
Only a few researchers have dealt explicitly with models within the APVP. In particular, Li et al. [2000]
have demonstrated nonparametric identiﬁcation within the conditional IPVP, a special case of the APVP,
while Li et al. [2002] have demonstrated nonparametric identiﬁcation within the APVP. One of the problems
that Li et al. faced when implementing their approach is that nonparametric kernel-smoothed estimators are
often slow to converge. In addition, Li et al. do not impose afﬁliation in their estimation strategy, so the ﬁrst-
order condition used in their two-step estimation strategy need not constitute an equilibrium. Hubbard et al.
[2009] have sought to address some of these technical problems using semiparametric methods which sacri-
ﬁce the full generality of the nonparametric approach in lieu of additional structure.
To date, except for Brendstrup and Paarsch [2007], no one has attempted to examine, empirically, models
in which the private values are potentially dependent, but not necessarily afﬁliated. Incidentally, using data
from sequential English auctions of two different objects, Brendstrup and Paarsch found weak evidence
against afﬁliation in the valuation draws of two objects for the same bidder.
de Castro[2007]hasnotedthat,withintheprivate-valuesparadigm,afﬁliationisunnecessarytoguarantee
the existence and uniqueness of a MPSE. In fact, he has demonstrated existence and uniqueness of a MPSE
under a weaker form of dependence, one where the inverse hazard rate is decreasing in the conditioned
argument.
Because afﬁliation is unnecessary to guarantee existence and uniqueness of bidding strategies in mod-
els of ﬁrst-price auctions with private values, expected revenue predictions based on empirical models in
which afﬁliation is imposed are potentially biased. Knowing whether valuations are afﬁliated is central
to ranking auction formats in terms of the expected revenues generated. In the absence of afﬁliation, the
expected-revenue rankings delivered by the linkage principle of Milgrom and Weber [1982] need not hold:
the expected-revenue rankings across auctions formats remain an empirical question. Thus, investigating theTESTING AFFILIATION IN MODELS OF AUCTIONS 3
empirical validity of afﬁliation appears both an important and a useful exercise.
In next section of this paper, we present a brief description of afﬁliation and its soldier—total positivity
of order two (TP2). Subsequently, following the theoretical work of de Castro [2007, 2008], who introduced
the notion of the grid distribution, in section 3 we construct a tractable empirical model of equilibrium
behaviour at ﬁrst-price auctions when the private valuations of bidders are potentially dependent, but not
necessarily afﬁliated.1 In section 4, we develop a test of afﬁliation, which is based on grid distributions,
rather than kernel-smoothing methods, thus avoiding the drawback encountered by Li et al. [2000, 2002],
while in section 5, we conduct a small-scale Monte Carlo to investigate the numerical as well as small-
sample properties of our proposed test. In section 6, we apply our methods in an empirical investigation of
low-price, sealed-bid, procurement-contract auctions held by the Department of Transportation in the State
of Michigan, and do not reject the null hypothesis of afﬁliation.
This information is potentially useful to a policy maker. The apparent high degree of estimated afﬁliation
also explains why low levels of observed competition are often sufﬁcient to maintain relatively low proﬁt
margins: strong afﬁliation is akin to ﬁerce competition. Under strong afﬁliation, a potential winner knows
that his nearest competitor probably has a valuation (cost) close to his, and this disciplines his bidding
behaviour: he becomes more aggressive than under independence. We summarize and conclude in section 7,
the ﬁnal section of the paper.
2. Afﬁliation and TP2. As mentioned above, afﬁliation is often described using an example with two
random variables that can take on either a low or an high value. The two random variables are afﬁliated if
high (low) values of each are more likely to occur than high and low or low and high values. A commonly-
used graph of the four possible outcomes in a two-bidder auction game with two values is depicted in ﬁgure
1.The (1,1)and (2,2)points are more likely than the (2,1)or (1,2)points. Letting pij denote the probability
of (i, j), afﬁliation in this example then reduces to TP2—viz.,
p11p22 ≥ p12p21.






must be weakly positive. Independence in valuations obviously satisﬁes the lower bound on this determi-
nental inequality. Note, too, that afﬁliation restricts distributions to a part of the simplex depicted in ﬁgure
2. In that ﬁgure, it is the region of the simplex that appears below a semi-circle rising from the line where
p11+ p22 equals one. In order to draw this ﬁgure, we needed to impose symmetry, so p12 and p21 are equal;
thus, the intercept for p12 is one half. Conditions that are weaker than afﬁliation, but that also guarantee
existence and uniqueness of equilibrium, are depicted in ﬁgure 2, too. In fact, in this simple example, the
entire simplex satisﬁes these weaker conditions. In richer examples, however, it is a subset of the simplex,
but one that contains the set of afﬁliated distributions. Thus, the assumption of afﬁliation could be important
in determining the revenues a seller can expect from a particular auction format.
Slavkovi´ c and Fienberg [2009] have discussed geometric representations of 2×2 distributions, like some
of those considered here. Their representations are based on tetrahedrons, while ours reduce to triangles
because of symmetry.
1The grid distributions discussed and used in this paper can also be modelled as contingency tables, which have been used ex-
tensively in applications in the social sciences; see Douglas et al. [1990] for the connections between contingency tables and positive


































FIG 3. Afﬁliation with Two Bidders and Three Values for Signals
Another important point to note is that afﬁliation is a global restriction. To see the importance of this
fact, introduce the valuation 3 for each bidder; ﬁve additional points then appear, as is depicted in ﬁgure
3. Afﬁliation requires that the probabilities at all collections of four points satisfy TP2; i.e., the following
additional six inequalities must hold:
p12p23 ≥ p13p22, p22p33 ≥ p23p32, p21p32 ≥ p22p31,
p11p33 ≥ p13p31, p12p33 ≥ p13p32, and p21p33 ≥ p23p31.
Of course, symmetry would imply that pij equal pji for all i and j, so the joint mass function for two bidders
















where the determinants of all (2×2) submatrices must be positive. Note, too, that all the points must also
live on the simplex, so
0 ≤ a,b,c,d,e, f < 1 and a+b+c+2d+2e+2f = 1.
How many inequalities are relevant? Let us represent the above matrix in the following tableau:
1 2 3
1 a d e
2 d b f
3 e f c6 L.I. DE CASTRO AND H.J. PAARSCH









nine possible combinations of four cells—i.e., nine inequalities. However, by symmetry, three are simply
duplicates of others. The following tableau represents all of the inequalities:
(1,2) (1,3) (2,3)
(1,2) ab ≥ d2 af ≥ de d f ≥ be
(1,3) af ≥ de ac ≥ e2 dc ≥ ef
(2,3) d f ≥ be dc ≥ ef bc ≥ f2
where (i, j)×(ℓ,m) means form a matrix with elements from rows i and j and columns ℓ and m of the
ﬁrst tableau. Observe that when the three inequalities highlighted in bold are satisﬁed, all others will be
also satisﬁed. In fact, the inequality (1,3)×(1,2) : af ≥ de derives from (1,2)×(1,2) : ab ≥ d2 and
(2,3)×(1,2) : d f ≥ be. Finally, inequality (2,3)×(1,3) : dc ≥ ef derives from the other two, previously
established—viz., (2,3)×(1,2):d f ≥be and (2,3)×(2,3):bc ≥ f2. All other inequalities can be obtained
from the adjacent ones in this fashion.
Adding values to the type spaces of bidders expands the number of determinental restrictions required
to satisfy TP2, thus restricting the space of distributions that can be entertained. Likewise, adding bidders
to the game, particularly if the bidders are assumed symmetric, also restricts the space of distributions that
can be entertained. For example, suppose a third bidder is added, one who is symmetric to the previous two.
The probability mass function for triplets of values (v1,v2,v3), where vn = 1,2,3 and n = 1,2,3, can be
represented as an array whose slices can then be represented by the following three matrices for bidders 1























In general, if the number of bidders is N and the number of values is k, then, without symmetry or afﬁliation,









probabilities can live on the simplex
via the determinental inequalities required by TP2. For it well-known that a function is MTP2 (afﬁliated), if
and only if, it is TP2 in all relevant collections of four points. As an aside, in this three-by-three example,
only nine constraints are relevant—viz.,
ab ≥ d2, bc ≥ f2, d f ≥ be, dh ≥ b2, hi ≥ g2, bg ≥ fh, eg ≥ f2, gj ≥ i2, and fi ≥ cg.
If these hold, then the remainder are satisﬁed, too. Knowing the maximum number of binding constraints is
relevant later in the paper when we discuss our test statistic.
Consider now the random N-vector V which equals (V1,...,VN), having joint density (mass) function fV
with realization v equal to (v1,...,vN). Afﬁliation can be formally deﬁned as follows: for all v and v′, the
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denotes the component-wise minima, sometimes referred to as the meet.
3. Theoretical Model. We develop our theoretical model within the private-values paradigm, assuming
away any interdependencies. We consider a set N of bidders {1,2,...,N}. Now, bidder n is assumed to
draw Vn, his private valuation of the object for sale, from the closed interval [v,v]. We note that, without
loss of generality, one can reparametrize the valuations from [v,v] to [0,1]. Below, we do this. We collect
the valuations in the vector v which equals (v1,...,vN) and denote this vector without the nth element by
v−n. Here, we have used the now-standard convention that upper-case letters denote random variables, while
lower-case ones denote their corresponding realizations. Note, too, that V lives in [0,1]N.
We assume that the values are distributed according to the probability density function fV : [0,1]N → R+
which is symmetric; i.e., for the permutation j : {1,...,N} → {1,...,N}, we have fV(v1,...,vN) equals
fV(vj(1),...,vj(N)). Letting fn(vn) denote the marginal probability density function of Vn, we note that it
equals
R 1
0    
R 1
0 fV(v−n,vn) dv−n. (Below, we constrain ourselves to the case where fn( ) is the same for all
n, but this is unnecessary and done only because, when we come to apply the method, we do have not enough
information to estimate the case with varying fns.) Our main interest is the case when fV is not the product






Finally, we denote the largest order statistic ofV−n given vn by Zn and its probability density and cumulative
distribution functions by f(zn|vn) and F(zn|vn), respectively.
We assume that bidders are risk neutral and abstract from a reserve price. Given his value vn, bidder n
tenders a bid sn ∈ R+. If his tender is the highest, then bidder n wins the object and pays what he bid. A pure
strategy is a function s : [0,1] → R+ which speciﬁes the bid s(vn) for each value vn. The interim pay-off of




f(zn|vn) dzn = (vn−sn)F[s−1(sn)|vn].
We focus on symmetric, increasing pure-strategy equilibria (PSE) which are deﬁned by s : [0,1] → R+ such
that
P[vn,s(vn),s−n] ≥ P(vn,s,s−n) ∀ s, vn.
As mentioned above, in most theoretical models of auctions that admit dependence in valuation draws, re-
searchers have assumed that fV satisﬁes afﬁliation. We do not restrict ourselves to fVs that satisfy afﬁliation.
We assume only that fV belongs to a set of distributions P which guarantees the existence and uniqueness of
a MPSE. This set P was fully characterized by de Castro [2008] in the particular case of grid distributions,
which are considered in our Assumption 4.1, below.
LetC denote the set of continuous density functions fV :[0,1]N →R+ and letA denote the set of afﬁliated
probability functions. For convenience and consistency with the notation used in later sections, we include
in A the set of all afﬁliated probability functions, not just the continuous ones. Endow C with the topology
of the uniform convergence—i.e., the topology deﬁned by the norm of the supremum
 fV  = sup
v∈[0,1]N
|fV(v)|.8 L.I. DE CASTRO AND H.J. PAARSCH
Let D be the set of probability functions fV : [0,1]N → R+ and assume there is a measure µ over it.
We now introduce a transformation Tk : D → D which is the workhorse of our method. To deﬁne Tk, let
I : [0,1] → {1,2,...,k} denote the function that associates to v ∈ [0,1] the ceiling ⌈kv⌉—viz., the smallest







. Similarly, let S(v) denote









where v collects (v1,v2,...,vN)∈[0,1]N.From this,we deﬁne














, for all combinations of mn ∈ {1,...,k}.








has volume (1/kN). Note that for
all probability density functions fV ∈D, T1(fV)(v) equals one for all v ∈ [0,1]N; i.e., T1(fV) is the uniform
distribution on [0,1]N.
We now need to introduce a compact notation to represent arrays of dimension
N times
                              
k×k×   ×k. We denote
byM kN
the set of arrays and by [P] an array in that set. When there are but two bidders, an array is obviously
just a matrix. In the application of this model to ﬁeld data, which we describe in section 6, N is three. The
(i1,i2,...,iN)th element of an array is denoted [P](i1,i2,...,iN), or [P](i) for short, where i denotes the vector









fV ∈D : ∃ [P] ∈M kN
, fV(v) = [P][I(v1),...,I(vN)]
 
.
Observe that Dk is a ﬁnite-dimensional set. In fact, when N is two, a probability density function fV ∈ Dk
can be described by a (k×k) matrix P as follows:






















Note, too, that the width of the cells can be allowed to vary. For example, one might be 0.3 wide, while the
next one can be 0.2 wide, the third 0.1 wide, the next 0.25, and the last 0.15. In fact, the transformation can
be deﬁned in terms of rectangles, instead of squares as above. To illustrate this, consider again the symmetric
case and introduce ﬁgure 4. Let 0 = r0 < r1 < r2 < ... < rk−1 < rk = 1 be an arbitrary partitioning of the
interval [0,1]. Now, deﬁne I : [0,1] → {1,2,...,k} by I(v) = j if and only if v ∈ (rj−1,rj]. Deﬁne B(v) as the












The following theorem was proven by de Castro [2007]:
THEOREM 3.1. Let f0
V be a symmetric and continuous probability density function. f0
V is afﬁliated if
and only if for all k, Tk
B(f0













FIG 4. Symmetric Non-Equi-Spaced Grid
In our notation,
f0
V ∈A ⇔ Tk
B(f0








Why is this important? Well, in many applications, the set of hypercubes deﬁned by a large k will have many
empty cells, which causes problems in both estimation and inference. Thus, one may want to subdivide the
space of valuations irregularly, but symmetrically, as illustrated in ﬁgure 4 when N is two.
4. Test of Afﬁliation. The key result from de Castro [2007] that allows us to develop our test of sym-
metric afﬁliation is the following: if the true probability density function f0
V exhibits afﬁliation, then Tk
B(f0
V),
a discretized version of it, will too. (See Theorem 3.1, above.) To the extent that the grid distribution Tk
B(f0
V)
can be consistently estimated from sample data, one can then test whether the estimated grid distribution ex-
hibits afﬁliation. Of course, sampling error will exist, but presumably one can evaluate its relative importance
using ﬁrst-order asymptotic methods.
Consider a sequence of T auctions indexed t = 1,...,T at which N bidders participated by submitting the
NT bids {{snt}N
n=1}T
t=1. We note that afﬁliation is preserved under a monotonic transformation, so examining
a discretization of g0
S(s), the true probability density function of bids under the hypothesis of expected-proﬁt
maximizing equilibrium behaviour, is the same as examining f0
V(v). Of course, neither f0
V nor g0
S is known.
One can, however, construct an estimate of Tk
B(g0





n = 1,...,N and t = 1,...,T
where s is the smallest observed bid and ¯ s is the largest observed bid, and then by breaking-up this hypercube10 L.I. DE CASTRO AND H.J. PAARSCH
into L(= kN) cells and counting the number of times that a particular N-tuple falls in that cell.2 Now, the
random vectorY, which represents the number of outcomes that fall in each of the cells and equals the vector
(Y1,Y2,...,YL)⊤, follows a multinomial distribution having the joint probability mass function
gY(y|p) =
T!







where pℓ equals Pr(Yℓ = yℓ), with yℓ = 0,1,...,T, while p collects (p1,...,pL) and lives on the simplex—
viz., the set
SL = {p|p ≥ 0L, i⊤
L p = 1}
with iL being an (L×1) vector of ones. Note, too, that i⊤y equals T, the number of observations.
For ℓ = 1,...,L, the unconstrained maximum-likelihood estimates of the pℓs are the (yℓ/T)s. To test for
afﬁliation, maximize the following logarithm of the likelihood function (minus a constant):
L(p) = y⊤log(p)
subject to
1) the vector p lies in the simplex SL;
2) all of the determinental inequalities required for TP2 hold.
Then compare this value of L with the unconstrained one.
While the determinental constraints required for TP2 are convex sets of the parameters when the subma-
trices are symmetric, they are not for general submatrices. However, by taking logarithms of both sides of
any general determinental inequality
ab ≥ cd,
one can convert this into a linear inequality, which does give rise to convex constraint sets, albeit in variables
that are logarithms of the original variables. To wit,
loga+logb−logc−logd ≥ 0
deﬁnes a convex set (in the transformed variables loga,...,logd). Of course, the adding-up constraint for
the simplex must be ﬁnessed—e.g., by considering the following:
exp(loga)+exp(logb)+exp(logc)+exp(logd)+... ≤ 1,
which gives rise to a convex set. Thus, the problem is almost a linear programme.
For known N and ﬁxed k, the speciﬁc steps involved in implementing the test in this problem are the
following. First, form the grid distribution of the joint density as the unknown array [P]. Letting [E] denote





2We know that the support of g0
S is strictly positive at s0(v), the true upper bound of support of bids, and we assume that f0
V is
strictly positive at v, so g0
S is strictly positive at s0(v), the true lower bound of support of bids. Consequently, the sample estimators of
the lower and upper bounds of support of S converge at rate T, which is faster than the rate of convergence of sample averages—rate √
T. Hence, when using sample averages in our estimation, we can ignore this ﬁrst-stage, pre-estimation error—at least under ﬁrst-order
asymptotic analysis.TESTING AFFILIATION IN MODELS OF AUCTIONS 11
Now, the following inequalities must be met:
log{[P](i)} ≤ 0 and å
i
exp(log{[P](i)}) ≤ 1, (4.2)
while symmetry requires the following linear restrictions:
[P](i) = [P][j(i)] (4.3)







hold. A test of afﬁliation, within a symmetric environment, involves comparing the maximum of equation
(4.1), subject to the constraints in (4.2) and (4.3), with the maximum of equation (4.1), subject to the con-
straints in (4.2), (4.3), and (4.4).
Our test of symmetric afﬁliation is based on the difference between the maximum of the logarithm of the
likelihood function L([ˆ P]) and the maximum of the logarithm of the likelihood function under symmetric
afﬁliation L([˜ P]). Obviously, the sampling theory associated with the difference in these two values of
the objective function L is not straightforward because not all of the inequality constraints required by
MTP2 may hold and, from sample to sample, the ones that do hold can change, but we shall suggest several
strategies to deal with this, below.
Experiencegleanedfromothermodelswitharelatedstructure—e.g.,Wolak[1987,1989a,b,1991]aswell
as Bartolucci and Forcina [2000], who investigated MTP2 in binary models—suggests that the likelihood
ratio (LR) statistic
2[L([ˆ P])−L([˜ P])] (4.5)
is not distributed according to a standard c2 random variable.
Introducing vec[P] as a short-hand notation, for the L-vector created from the array [P], our constrained-
optimization problem can be summarized in a notation similar to that of Wolak (1989b) as:
max
vec[P]
y⊤log(vec[P]) subject to h(vec[P]) ≥ 0J
where h : RL → RJ is the function representing all J relevant constraints where J ≤ L and L is the total
number of variables under the alternative hypothesis. (Here, for notational parsimony, we have ignored the
adding-up condition, which is implicit.)
Consider Nd(vec[P0]), a neighbourhood of the true value vec[P0]. Denote by H(vec[P0]) the matrix of par-
tial derivatives whose (i, j)-element is
¶hi(vec[P])
¶vec[P]j . Now, let us deﬁne the setB ={vec[P]:H(vec[P0])vec[P]≥









evaluated at vec[P0]. Finally, denote by
P0 = H(vec[P0])I(vec[P0])−1H(vec[P0])⊤
the variance-covariance matrix of h(vec[ˆ P]) and by w(j,J − j,P0), the probability that j constraints bind,
that (J− j) constraints are strictly satisﬁed; i.e., they are nonbinding. We have the following:12 L.I. DE CASTRO AND H.J. PAARSCH
THEOREM 4.1. Consider the local hypothesis testing problem
H0 : h(vec[P]) ≥ 0J vec[P] ∈ Nd(vec[P0])
H1 : not H0.
The asymptotic distribution of the likelihood-ratio statistic satisﬁes the following property:
sup
b∈B




Pr(Wj ≥ c)w(j,J− j,P0).
where D is the asymptotic value of the test statistic, while Wj is an independent c2 random variable having
j degrees of freedom.
PROOF. It is sufﬁcient and straightforward to verify that the assumptions of Theorem 4.2 in Wolak
[1989b] are satisﬁed. ￿
Because this statistic depends on the unknown population grid distribution [P0], the statistic is not pivotal.
Kodde and Palm [1986] have provided lower and upper bounds for this test statistic for tests of various sizes
and different numbers of maximal constraints.
According to Wolak [1989b], the best way to evaluate the weights is using Monte Carlo simulation.
Wolak also offered lower and upper bounds for the probabilities above (see his equations 19 and 20, p.215);
these bounds are based on Kodde and Palm [1986]. An alternative strategy would be to adapt the bootstrap
methods of Bugni [2008] to get the appropriate p-values of the test statistic. Yet a third strategy would be to
adapt the subsampling methods described in Politis et al. [1999] as was done by Romano and Shaikh [2008].
4.1. Some Comparisons with Other Nonparametric Methods. It should be noted, too, that our proposed
estimation strategy involves nothing more than estimating an histogram using a special class of grids. Scott
[1992, p. xi] has argued that the classical histogram “remains the most widely applied and most intuitive
nonparametric estimator.” In other words, the procedure proposed here is not based on any unfamiliar con-
cepts. Of course, there are more statistically efﬁcient methods, but they also have limitations, as Scott [1992]
has discussed. Also, although the rate of convergence of histogram estimation is slow, it is still reasonable;
see Scott [1992, Theorem 3.5, p. 82].
Note, too, the similarities between grid-distribution and kernel-smoothed estimators. Kernel-smoothed
density estimators are well-behaved and have good rates of convergence when the probability density func-
tions to be estimated are continuously differentiable C1.3 The set C1 is dense in the set of all probability
density functions. Similarly, grid distribution estimators are well behaved for probability density functions
in D¥ = ∪¥
k=1Dk, which is also a dense set in the set of all probability density functions.4 While C1 proba-
bility density functions form a familiar and well-known class probability density functions, the probability
density functions in Dk are also familiar because they are just (a special class of) simple functions, which
are fundamental, such as in the deﬁnition of the Lebesgue integral. When estimating grid distributions, one
has to choose k or, equivalently, the size of the bin (1/k), which is nothing more than the bandwidth of the
grid-distribution estimator. Similarly, kernel-smoothing requires a choice of bandwidth parameter, too. In
sum, nonparametric estimation using either grid distributions or smoothed kernels is very similar.
3Methods exist that require fewer smoothness conditions—e.g., the function need just be continuous C0; others require additional
smoothness, C2 or higher. This does not change our claims.
4Recall that Dk is the set of grid distributions where the interval is subdivided into k intervals; i.e., Dk ≡ Tk(D).TESTING AFFILIATION IN MODELS OF AUCTIONS 13
4.2. Consistency and Power of the Proposed Test. Of course, one concern is that k appears ﬁxed in our
analysis, but T is increasing, so our test is potentially inconsistent. We imagine a sequence of {kT} with
values increasing as T increases, but not as fast as T. Below, we discuss in detail what we have in mind.
Another worry is that the test statistic will be ill-behaved if kT tends to inﬁnity. Thus, an upper bound ¯ k
must exist. This discussion leads us to introduce the following assumption concerning f0
V which allows us to
side-step these technical problems:
ASSUMPTION 4.1. The true data-generating process f0




As the discussion above made clear, this assumption is similar to the assumptions of smoothness con-
cerning f0
V which kernel-smoothing methods require. In addition to this analogy, we offer two additional
justiﬁcations for Assumption 4.1.
First, the set of grid distributions is dense in the set of all distributions: even if the data-generating process
(DGP) f0
V were not a grid distribution, there is a grid distribution that is arbitrary close to it. To wit, no ﬁnite
amount of data could reject Assumption 4.1. In this sense, Assumption 4.1 is almost “no assumption.”
Second, the DGP in question is a distribution of values, which are discrete (up to, say, dollars or cents
or Yen or Won or whatever units one wants). When one assumes a smooth probability density function, one
is making an approximation, for computational convenience: such an approximation does not seem, to us
at least, any more appealing than the one we make. On the contrary, it seems more natural to us to assume
simple probability density functions rather than any smoothness conditions. In general, smoothness is just
a tool used to lighten the burden in the technical analysis of a particular problem. In our case, by assuming
that the distribution is simple (i.e., a grid distribution), we can stay closer to reality.
Under Assumption 4.1,ourtestisconsistent.For Assumption 4.1 impliesthatak existssuchthat f0
V ∈Dk.
Therefore, the number of inequalities required for afﬁliation remains ﬁxed. We are then in the standard
framework considered by Wolak, which has a ﬁxed set of inequalities. Thus, consistency follows directly
from Wolak’s research. A technically sophisticated reader may feel that our consistency result is trivial,
once Assumption 4.1 is made. The point of this paper (and this subsection, in particular) is not to provide a
technical proof of consistency, but rather to remove any doubts concerning the consistency of our test under
a reasonable assumption.
The power of the proposed test clearly depends on the choice of k. Were k chosen to be one (i.e., a uniform
distribution on the N-dimensional hypercube), then afﬁliation would never be rejected. On the other hand,
given a ﬁnite sample of T observations, a large k will result in many cells having no elements. While the
choice of k is obviously important and certainly warrants additional theoretical investigation, perhaps along
the lines of research in time-series analysis by Guay et al. [2008] concerning optimal adaptive detection of
correlation functions, it is beyond the scope of this paper. In fact, in most applications to auctions, where
samples are often quite small, k will be dictated by practical considerations—viz., the relative size of T.
4.3. Bounding the Number of Inequalities. For our test statistic to be well-behaved, it is important to
know that an upper bounds exists on the number of inequalities. For arbitrary N and k, assuming a symmetric


















N) is a permutation of (i1,i2,...,iN). Thus, we need only consider sorted indices, indices
(i1,i2,...,iN) for which i1 ≥i2 ≥   ≥iN. Consider (i1,i2,...,iN), a sorted index having ℓ different numbers;
let r1,...,rℓ denote the number of repetitions of the different numbers in (i1,i2,...,iN). Obviously, r1+...+14 L.I. DE CASTRO AND H.J. PAARSCH
rℓ = N. Using this notation, the number of permutations of (i1,i2,...,iN) is then N!
r1!...rℓ!. For instance, the
index (4,3,3,2,2,2) has 6!
1!2!3! or 120 different permutations.
Given the above, we can now focus our attention to sorted indices only. Consider the lexicographic order
of them. In this way, we can attribute an unambiguous natural number to each sorted index of length N.
For example, consider N = 3 in which case (1,1,1) corresponds to 1; (2,1,1), to 2; (2,2,1), to 3; (3,1,1) to
5; (3,2,2), to 7; and (4,1,1) to 11. It is important to develop an algorithm to convert a sorted index into a
corresponding number, which we describe now.
First, let us deﬁne Num(j,N) as the number of all indices that are weakly below (in the lexicographic
order) to the index (j, j,..., j); i.e., the index that has j in all positions and has length N. It is easy to
see that Num(1,N) = 1, because there is just one index weakly below (1,1,1,...,1) : (1,1,1,...,1), itself.
Also, Num(2,2) = 3, because (1,1), (2,1), and (2,2) are the sorted indices weakly below (2,2). Similarly,
Num(2,3) = 4, because (1,1,1), (2,1,1), (2,2,1), (2,2,2) are the sorted indices weakly below (2,2,2).
From this argument, it is not difﬁcult to see that Num(2,N) = N +1. Observe, too, that Num(j,1) = j,
because there are only the indexes (1), (2), ..., (j) weakly below (j). de Castro [2008] has proven the
following:





Thus, if we ﬁx the number of bidders N and the number of intervals k, then there are M ≡ Num(k,N) =  N+k−1
k−1
 
different indices. Afﬁliation will be satisﬁed if the corresponding inequality is satisﬁed for any






2 pair of such indices, it is sufﬁcient to test (M2−M)/2
inequalities. Note, however, that this is an upper bound because some inequalities are implied by others.
The above discussion also provides some guidance concerning how to choose the inequalities; however, in
an effort to conserve space, we leave the discussion of what the minimal set of sufﬁcient inequalities is to
another paper.
4.4. Two Related Papers. Like us, Li and Zhang [2008] have examined some important economic im-
plications of afﬁliation. Instead of considering bids, however, Li and Zhang examined the entry behaviour
of potential bidders whose signals may be afﬁliated. Theirs is a parametric analysis and they implemented
their test using simulation methods, examining timber sales organized by the Department of Forestry in the
State of Oregon. Li and Zhang found only a small degree of afﬁliation, perhaps because the zero/one entry
decision is not as informative as bid data.
Jun et al. [2009] have developed a consistent nonparametric test designed for continuous data. By avoid-
ing discretization, Jun et al. presumably have more information than we do. On the other hand, having
rejected afﬁliation with their test, it is unclear what to do within their framework because an alternative hy-
pothesis is unspeciﬁed. In contrast, our approach augments the theoretical work of de Castro [2008] where
the alternative hypothesis is clearly outlined.
4.5. Policy Uses for Grid Distributions. de Castro [2008] has developed a complete theoretical treat-
ment of grid distributions, even in the absence of afﬁliation. His idea is as follows: ﬁrst, assume that f0
V ∈Dk
for some k; i.e, the DGP is a grid distribution—Assumption 4.1 holds. Standard estimation methods (his-
tograms) can be used to calculate [ˆ P] ∈Dk that best approximate f0
V.
Under de Castro’s method, one can then test whether [ˆ P] has a symmetric MPSE. The method developed
by de Castro is exact: to wit, modulo sampling error, [ˆ P] has a symmetric MPSE if and only if the method
detects it. Errors can occur only in simple numerical operations such as sums, divisions and square roots. It
turns out that determining the existence of a symmetric MPSE is nontrivial when afﬁliation is absent.TESTING AFFILIATION IN MODELS OF AUCTIONS 15
If [ˆ P] has a symmetric MPSE, then it can be used to calculate expected revenues under the ﬁrst- and
second-price auctions, denoted R1
[ˆ P] and R2
[ˆ P], respectively. In this way, one can determine which auction
format yields an higher expected revenue for [ˆ P] and, also, the magnitude of the revenue difference (R2
[ˆ P]−
R1
[ˆ P]), to decide whether it is signiﬁcant.
The procedure can then be repeated using [˜ P], which is obtained under the constraint that the distribution
satisﬁes afﬁliation. We know that, under afﬁliation, a symmetric MPSE exists and that (R2
[˜ P]−R1
[˜ P]) > 0, but
the method also allows one to decide whether the magnitudes of the differences (R1
[ˆ P]−R1




Finally, the method allows one to examine sampling variability by repeating the above procedures using
resampled draws from [ˆ P] or [˜ P].
Thus, the grid distributions proposed in this paper have many advantages because a theory exists that
can be used for policy analysis. Such theories have not yet been developed for the methods proposed by
Li and Zhang [2008] or Jun et al. [2009]; if afﬁliation is rejected under their methods, then what to do?
5. Monte Carlo Experiment. Below, we describe a small-scale Monte Carlo experiment used to inves-
tigate the numerical as well as small-sample properties of our testing strategy. Our simulation study involved
samples of size T equal 100 and 250 with N of three bidders; each sample was then replicated 1,000 times. In
all of the experiments, the building blocks were triplets of independently- and identically-distributed uniform
random variables on the interval [0,1]. We considered the following three types of experiments:
SI) (U1,U2,U3) are independent uniform random variables;
SA) (U1,U2,U3) are symmetric and afﬁliated random variables according to the Frank copula which has












where the parameter a controls afﬁliation;


















Above, SI denotes symmetric independence, which is the knife-edge case of afﬁliation when all J of the
TP2 determinants are exactly zero; SA denotes symmetric afﬁliation, which is the case when all of the TP2
determinants are positive; and AN denotes asymmetric nonafﬁliation, which is the case when none of the
TP2 determinental inequalities are satisﬁed.16 L.I. DE CASTRO AND H.J. PAARSCH
What interpretation can be given to the dependence parameter a? In the bivariate case, the larger is a
positive value of a, the greater the concordance, positive dependence. On the other hand, a very negative
value of a indicates negative dependence. Independence obtains when a approaches zero. Note, however,
that when N exceeds two, a is restricted to be positive because a negative a would mean a nonmonotonic
inverse-generator function of the Frank copula; see example 4.22, page 123 in Nelsen [1999]. The Frank












a > 0. (5.3)
Mueller and Scarsini [2005] have characterized various notions of positive dependence, such as MTP2, for
the Archimedean family of copulas, of which the Frank copula is a member. They have also presented a
general condition that the generator of an arbitrary Archimedean copula must satisfy in order to guarantee
that MTP2 holds (cf. Theorem 2.11 in their paper). Genest [1987] has shown that the relevant condition for
the Frank copula coincides with the condition that guarantees a monotonic inverse-generator function when
N exceeds two; viz., a must be positive. Genest’s condition requires that the Frank copula satisfy TP2 as he
was only concerned with the bivariate Frank copula. As mentioned above, however, it is well-known that a
function is MTP2 if and only if it is TP2 in all pairs.
TosimulatedatafromaFrankcopulawithafﬁliation,wefollowedtheapproachdescribedbyLuciano et al.
[2004]. Theirs involves conditional sampling where, initially, w1, a U(0,1) random draw is taken, and then
u1 is set equal to it. The next (dependent) draw is taken from C2(w2|u1), and u3 is drawn from C3(w3|u1,u2)
where all the wis are independent U(0,1) draws. We implemented conditional sampling using the parame-
terization of the Frank copula given in equation (5.3) in conjunction with the generator function deﬁned
in equation (5.1) and the inverse-generator function deﬁned in equation (5.2). Speciﬁcally, to generate
symmetrically-afﬁliated draws (u1,u2,u3) from the trivariate Frank copula, we did the following:
1. simulate the independent random variables (w1,w2,w3) from U(0,1);
2. set u1 equal to w1;





















which is then solved for u3.
The above algorithm yields three symmetrically-afﬁliated random draws from the trivariate Frank copula for
one simulation draw; this procedure was repeated either 100 or 250 times for each of 1,000 replications.
In ﬁgure 5, we present a plot of all the points, when N is three and T is 250, for one replication generated













































































































































































































































FIG 7. SI, SA, NA: k = 3, T = 100 and T = 250
scatterplot looks as one would expect—uniform. In ﬁgure 6, we present a plot of all the points, when N is
three and T is 250, for one replication generated when a is 2, which means only modest afﬁliation. Note, in
the scatterplot, a bit of white space exists in the extremes—e.g., near (0,1,1).
We solved the constrained nonlinear optimization problems speciﬁed by equations (4.1), (4.2), (4.3),
and (4.4) by implementing our methods using the programming language AMPL; for additional details
concerning AMPL, see Fourer et al. [2002]. Using AMPL has a number of advantages: ﬁrst, its user interface
admits choice among a variety of nonlinear optimization solvers, including SNOPT and MINOS, without
having to modify code signiﬁcantly; second, AMPL can also perform automatic differentiation on nonlinear
programming problems; and, third, the language is free. In fact, users can run the code for free using the
NEOS server online. The code for a representative estimation problem ran in around one second on an
unremarkable desktop computer.
In ﬁgure 7 are presented the frequency distributions of the LR test statistics for SI, SA, and NA when
k is three and T is either 100 or 250. Our test appears able to distinguish relatively well between weak
and modest afﬁliation, and to detect nonafﬁliation extremely well. The test has relatively high power in the
case NA, nonafﬁlation. Note, too, that as T increases, the distribution of the test statistic under SI remains
constant, the one under SA shifts to the left, and the one under NA shifts to the right.
For k of three and T of 100 with symmetric independence, one can calculate the weights {w(j,J −
j,P0)}J
j=0 in Theorem 4.1. In ﬁgure 8, we present the exact probability density function of the asymptotic
approximation as well as the kernel-smoothed estimate using the Monte Carlo data. The approximation
appears quite close to the actual process, suggesting that the ﬁrst-order asymptotics are working quite well.
6. Empirical Application. Above, in section 3, in the tradition of the theoretical literature concerning
auctions, we developed our model of bidding in terms of valuations for an object to be sold at auction under
the ﬁrst-price, sealed-bid format. Sealed-bid tenders are often used in procurement—i.e., low-price, sealed-
bid auctions at which a buyer (often a government agency) seeks to ﬁnd the lowest-cost producer of some
good or service. In this section, we report results from an empirical investigation of procurement tendersTESTING AFFILIATION IN MODELS OF AUCTIONS 19
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FIG 8. Asymptotic and Kernel-Smoothed Density of Test Statistic: SI, k = 3, T = 100
for road resurfacing by a government agency. Although it is well-known that results from auctions can be
translated to procurement, and vice versa, sometimes this translation is tedious. We direct the interested
reader to the work of de Castro and de Frutos [forthcoming] who have developed a procedure to translate
results from auctions to procurement.
We have applied our empirical framework to data from low-price, sealed-bid, procurement auctions held
by the Department of Transportation (DOT) in the State of Michigan. At these auctions, qualiﬁed ﬁrms are
invited to bid on jobs that involve resurfacing roads in Michigan. We have chosen this type of auction be-
cause the task at hand is quite well-understood. In addition, there are reasons to believe that ﬁrm-speciﬁc
characteristics make the private-cost paradigm a reasonable assumption; e.g., the reservation wages of own-
ers/managers, who typically are paid the residual, can vary considerably across ﬁrms. On the other hand,
other features suggest that the cost signals of individual bidders could be dependent, perhaps even afﬁliated;
e.g., these ﬁrms hire other factor services in the same market and, thus, face the same costs for inputs such
as energy as well as paving inputs. For example, suppose paving at auction t has the following Leontief












where h denotes the managerial labour, while y and z denote other factor inputs which are priced compet-
itively at Wt and Xt, respectively, at auction t. Assume that Rn, bidder n’s marginal value of time, is an
independent, private-cost draw from a common distribution. In addition, assume that the other factor prices
Wt and Xt are draws from another joint distribution, and that they are independent of Rn. The marginal cost
per mile Cnt at auction t can be then written as:
Cnt = dhRn+dyWt +dzXt,
which is a special case of an afﬁliated private-cost (APC) model, known as a conditional private-cost model.
The costs in this model are afﬁliated only when the distribution of Rn is log-concave, which is discussed20 L.I. DE CASTRO AND H.J. PAARSCH
TABLE 1
Sample Descriptive Statistics—Dollars/Mile: N = 3; T = 278
Variable Mean St.Dev. Median Minimum Maximum
Engineer’s Estimate 475,544.54 491,006.52 307,331.26 54,574.41 3,694,272.59
Winning Bid 466,468.63 507,025.81 286,102.57 41,760.32 3,882,524.81
All Tendered Bids 507,332.42 564,842.58 317,814.77 41,760.32 5,693,872.81
extensively in de Castro [2008]. Li et al. [2000] have studied this model, extensively. In short, the afﬁliated
private-cost paradigm (APCP) seems a reasonable null hypothesis.
We did not investigate issues relating to asymmetries across bidders because we do not know bidder
identities, data necessary to implement such a speciﬁcation. Because no reserve price exists at these auctions,
we treat the number of participants as if it were the number of potential bidders and focus on auctions at
which three bidders participated. Thus, we are ignoring the potential importance of participation costs which
others, including Li [2005], have investigated elsewhere.
The data for this part of the paper were provided by the Michigan DOT and were organized and used by
Hubbard et al. [2009]; a complete description of these data is provided in that paper. In table 1, we present
the summary descriptive statistics concerning our sample of 834 observations—278 auctions that involved
three bidders each. We chose auctions with just three bidders not only to illustrate the general nature of
the method (if we can do three, then we can do N), but also to reduce the data requirements. When we
subdivide the unit hypercube into kN cells, the average number of bids in a cell is proportional to (kN/T).
When N is very large, the sample size must be on the order of kN in order to expect at least one observation
in each cell. This example also illustrates the potential limitations of our approach; viz., even in relatively
large samples, some of the cells will not be populated, so k will need to be kept small. However, one can
circumvent this problem by varying the width of the subdivisions as we do below. Of course, one must then
adjust the conditions which deﬁne the determinental inequalities. We describe this below, too.
Our bid variable is the price per mile. Notice that both the winning bids as well as all tendered bids vary
considerably, from a low of $41,760.32 per mile to a high of $5,693,872.81 per mile. What explains this
variation? Well, presumbably heterogeneity in the tasks that need to be performed. One way to control for
this heterogeneity would be to retrieve each and every contract and then to construct covariates from those
contracts. Unfortunately, the State of Michigan cannot provide us with this information, at least not any time
soon.
How can we deal with this heterogeneity? Well, in our case, we have an engineer’s estimate p of the price
per mile to complete the project.5 We assume that Cnt, the cost to bidder n at auction t, can be factored as
follows:
Cnt = l0(pt)ent (6.1)






5Of course, besides p, it is possible that other covariates, which are common knowledge to all the bidders, exist. If these other
common-knowledge covariates exist, then we could wrongly conclude that the signals have a strong form of correlation when, in
fact, the correctly-speciﬁed model of signals (conditioned on the common-knowledge information) would have only small correlation.
Unfortunately, we do not have access to any additional information. Were such information available, then we would condition on it as
well.TESTING AFFILIATION IN MODELS OF AUCTIONS 21




























FIG 9. Data as well as NP, LS, and LAD Regressions: Logarithm of Bids versus Logarithm of Engineer’s Estimate







or nonparametrically, using the following empirical speciﬁcation:
logBnt = y(pt)+Unt
where y(pt) denotes −log[l0(pt)] and Unt denotes log[b(ent)].
Empirical results from this exercise are presented in ﬁgure 9. In this ﬁgure are presented results for
the nonparametric regression (NP), the least-squares regression (LS), the least-absolute-deviations (LAD)
regression. To get some notion of the relative ﬁt, note that the R2 for the LS regression is around 0.97.
The LS estimates of the constant and slope coefﬁcients are −0.3114 and 1.0268, respectively, while LAD
estimates of the constant and slope coefﬁcients are −0.3221 and 1.0276, respectively.
Subsequently, we took the normalized ﬁtted residuals, which (for the LS case) are depicted in ﬁgure 10,
and applied the methods described in section 4 above for a k of two. Our test results are as follows: the
maximum of the logarithm of the likelihood function (minus a constant) without symmetry was −442.50,
while the maximum of the logarithm of the likelihood function under symmetry was −444.88, and under
symmetric afﬁliation it was also −444.88—a total difference of 2.38.6 At size 0.05, twice the above differ-
ence is above the lower bound provided by Kodde and Palm [1986], but below the upper bound, so the test
is inconclusive.
6The results for the LAD residuals were identical: the probability array obtained by discretizing the LAD residuals was exactly the
same as in the LS case because none of the ﬁtted residuals was classiﬁed differently. This is not, perhaps, surprising given the similar

























FIG 10. Scatterplot of Transformed Fitted LS Residuals
Because a k of two is unusually small, we introduced a symmetric, but nonequispaced, grid distribution—
like the one depicted in ﬁgure 4, but with intervals [0.,0.4), [0.4,0.6), and [0.6,1.0]. The TP2 inequalities
can be derived in the usual way, but the adding-up inequality must be rewritten, in this case as
a+2b+8c+8d+16e+8f +4d+2h+4i+4b+16f +8g+8e+2g+8j+8f +16c+8i ≤ 1.
Again, we applied our methods. Our test results are as follows: the maximum of the logarithm of the like-
lihood function (minus a constant) under symmetry was −715.72, while the maximum under symmetric
afﬁliation was −716.49—a difference of 0.77.7 At size 0.05, twice the above difference is below the lower
bound provided by Kodde and Palm, so we do not reject the hypothesis of symmetric afﬁliation. To put these
results into some context, the centre of the simplex had a logarithm of the likelihood function of −916.24;
using the marginal distribution of low, medium, and high costs (0.4233,0.4808,0.0959) and imposing inde-
pendence yielded a logarithm of the likelihood function of −784.67.
7. Summary and Conclusions. We have constructed a tractable empirical model of equilibrium be-
haviour at ﬁrst-price auctions when bidders’ private valuations are dependent, but not necessarily afﬁliated.
Subsequently, we developed a test of afﬁliation and then investigated its small-sample properties. We ap-
plied our framework to data from low-price, sealed-bid auctions used by the Michigan DOT to procure
road-resurfacing: we do not reject the hypothesis of afﬁliation in cost signals.
This information is potentially useful to a policy maker. The apparent high degree of estimated afﬁliation
also explains why low levels of observed competition are often sufﬁcient to maintain relatively low proﬁt
margins: strong afﬁliation is akin to ﬁerce competition. Under strong afﬁliation, a potential winner knows
that his nearest competitor probably has a valuation (cost) close to his, and this disciplines his bidding
behaviour: he become more aggressive than under independence.
7The results for the LAD residuals were virtually identical: the probability array obtained by discretizing the LAD residuals was
almost the same as in the LS case.TESTING AFFILIATION IN MODELS OF AUCTIONS 23
Our research has other policy implications, too. As mentioned above, it is well-known that, under af-
ﬁliation, the English auction format, on average, generates more revenue for the seller than the ﬁrst-price,
sealed-bid format. In procurement, under afﬁliation, an English or a Vickrey auction would get the job done
more cheaply than the low-price, sealed-bid format, Were the English or Vickrey formats being used and
afﬁliation not rejected, then the procurement agency would be justiﬁed in its choice of mechanism. What
remains a bit of a puzzle is why the low-price, sealed-bid format is used in the presence of such strong
afﬁliation. Perhaps, other features, such as the ability of the low-price, sealed-bid auction format to thwart
collusion are important, too. Alternatively, perhaps other moments of the bid distribution, such as the vari-
ance, are important to the procurement agency.
On the other hand, had afﬁliation been rejected, then the procedures described in section 4 could be used
to determine which auction format would get the job done most cheaply, on average. Again, it is possible
that the English or Vickrey formats would still be preferred. In any case, the methods described in section 4
permit a better understanding of the bidding differences, which can aid in choosing the best auction format.
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